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Abstract
This paper argues that considerable switches in monetary policy are able to explain a major
part of the forward discount puzzle. We build a theoretical model suggesting that violations
of the uncovered interest rate parity are owed to shifts in monetary policy from a destabilizing
(when the Taylor principle is violated) to a stabilizing regime (when a central bank follows a
Taylor-type rule). Following the switch is an “adjustment period” during which forecasters
gradually update their expectations, eventually restoring the parity. It is in this adjustment
period, when the forward discount puzzle arises. In the second part of the paper we test
the model on the Canadian dollar, German mark, and British pound, all against the US
dollar. Results indicate that the forward discount puzzle loses significance after allowing
for an adjustment period of about 1 – 2 years. Our results are robust to various different
specifications, such as the use of different maturities or base currencies. Further, it seems
unlikely that our results coincide with contemporaneous events.
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“Just how far Mr. Volcker will go in wielding the monetary sledgehammer is open to question.”
Lakeland Ledger (newspaper) on August 19, 1979.
1 Introduction
Although heavily researched, the forward discount puzzle (FDP from here on) still requires pieces
to be solved. Forward exchange rates are supposed to be an unbiased predictor of future spot
rates, but numerous studies have shown that they are not.1 The search for possible explanations
has been going on for a while, but it appears as if there is not one major cause for the significant
deviation from uncovered interest rate parity (UIRP), but rather a combination of reasons is
more likely to be the solution, as pointed out by Sarantis (2006) for example. To date, three
major explanations of the puzzle exist: (1) a risk premium, (2) infrequent portfolio decisions,
and (3) expectations errors.
Considering the first alternative, Froot and Frankel (1989) use survey data to decompose
the bias into portions attributed to a risk premium and to expectations errors. Their findings
indicate that a risk premium can at best explain a small portion of the puzzle. Subsequently,
Engel (1996) provides a good summary of the literature focusing on the risk premium. Although
the risk premium explanation has not received much support for a while, more recent papers
are reviving its validity, such as Lustig and Verdelhan (2007), Verdelhan (2010) or Alvarez et al.
(2009).
The second possible explanation focuses on the frequency of market participants’ portfo-
lio decisions. Bacchetta and Wincoop (2005) and Bacchetta and Van Wincoop (2007, 2010)
demonstrate that it could be optimal for rational decision makers to manage their portfolio
only on occasion, as corresponding fees may be higher than gains from trading more frequently,
leading to violations of the UIRP. But if this were the entire solution, a few powerful traders
could take advantage of forward excess returns in the long run. Plus, the puzzle would have to
exist throughout large sample periods if we assume that the structure of fees remained mostly
unchanged. However, several analyses suggest that the FDP is only a temporary phenomenon,
as we discuss in more depth below.
1See Froot and Thaler (1990), Lewis (1995), Engel (1996), or more recently Chinn (2006) for summaries. In the
following, we use the FDP and violations of the UIRP as synonimous statements, as is common in the literature.
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Finally, a third explanation of the FDP focuses on expectations errors. If forecasters calculate
the forward exchange rate on the basis of their expectations, those expectations rely on a given
set of information. Consequently, if forecasters have an incomplete set of information regarding
the determination of the future spot rate, their predictions could be biased. Various studies
underline the importance of expectations errors, including Froot and Frankel (1989), Mark and
Wu (1998), MacDonald (2002), Gourinchas and Tornell (2004), or Lothian and Wu (2011).
Moon and Velasco (2011) and Sakoulis et al. (2010) are more specific in naming a reason for
potential expectations errors. Moon and Velasco (2011) attribute the strong predictability of
foreign excess returns in the 1980s to changes in forecasting techniques from fundamentalists to
chartists in the United States, as discussed in Frankel and Froot (1990). Several other studies
also show that the FDP is particularly prevalent in the 1980s, such as Choi and Zivot (2007),
Sakoulis et al. (2010), or Lothian and Wu (2011). In particular, Sakoulis et al. (2010) considers
shocks to US monetary policy in the early 1980s as a main driver of the violation of UIRP.
Our contribution is twofold. First, we provide evidence that the FDP is a temporary phe-
nomenon that persisted for less than two years in the 1970s and 1980s, narrowing down both
the time frame, which was previously suggested (the 1980s), and the amount of break points
in the data (see Sakoulis et al., 2010 for instance). Second, we provide a precise explanation of
why the UIRP is violated over that short time period: In the 1970s/1980s each major central
bank drastically revised their conduct of monetary policy by implementing – either explicitly or
implicitly – inflation targeting through adhering to a Taylor-type rule (for details see Clarida
et al., 1998). Since these one-time changes were (1) unexpected, (2) potentially non-credible
for the public, and/or (3) lead to uncertainty on how to calculate future exchange rates, their
forecasting models resulted in expectations errors. In the time following the monetary policy
shift, the forward discount bias arises and is slowly closed after forecasters gradually adjust to
the new system. Thus, our argument further strengthens the expectations errors hypothesis and
also provides evidence for the existence of specific break points, which may be responsible for
the resulting expectations errors.
We test this hypothesis by examining four major central banks – the Federal Reserve Bank,
the Bundesbank, the Bank of Canada, and the Bank of England – with their corresponding
currencies: the U.S. dollar, German mark, Canadian dollar, and British pound. All four central
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banks have undertaken a drastic switch in monetary policy towards targeting inflation (by
applying a Taylor-type rule), albeit at different times, as discussed in Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy (2011).
We find that the UIRP is significantly violated for only about 1.5 years following each central
bank’s policy shift, out of the 33-year observation period in the entire sample. Our results remain
consistent for different base countries, several forecast horizons, and a test for an alternative
explanation, which might coincide with our theory.
The following section develops an intuitive theoretical framework, describing how forecasters
make their decision in determining the forward exchange rate. Section 3 starts with a description
of our methodology and data and then proceeds with the empirical part of the paper. Finally,
section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
A standard approach to testing the forward discount puzzle (FDP) is to regress foreign excess
returns on the “forward discount”:2
st+k − ft|k = α+ β · (ft|k − st) + t+k, (1)
where st+k represents the spot bilateral nominal exchange rate in period t+k, ft|k is the forward
rate k periods ahead as predicted at time t, st stands for the spot rate at time t, and t+k is a zero-
mean error term. Under uncovered interest rate parity – assuming no arbitrage, risk neutrality,
and rational expectations – both α and β should be insignificantly different from zero, making
ft|k an unbiased predictor of st+k. A typical result, however, is that β is statistically different
from zero, with its point estimate being negative.
How is the forward rate ft|k determined? As an example, consider the CAD/USD exchange
rate. At time t the Fed (or the Bank of Canada) announces the implementation of stabilizing
monetary policy with the aim to control inflation and to promote growth. In the literature, this
is often viewed as adhering to some form of the Taylor rule, which assumes that a central bank
adjusts the nominal interest rate in response to deviations of inflation from a constant target
2This formulation of the FDP follows Froot and Frankel (1989, p. 142, equation (2)) and Moon and Velasco
(2011).
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and output from the trend. Taylor (1993) stresses that in order to run stable monetary policy,
a central bank should respond more than one-for-one to inflation, which became known as the
Taylor principle. Now what happens after the Fed’s announcement? If forecasters determine ft|k
in the market, there are two possibilities: (1) the Fed does follow an inflation-stabilizing Taylor-
type rule, making the forward rate ft|k = EsTt+k or (2) the Fed does not follow a Taylor-type
rule and ft|k = EsNt+k.
Why would a forecaster consider EsNt+k, even though the announcement has been made? One
could think of several reasons. For example, forecasters may (a) question the Fed’s willingness
or capabilities in applying a Taylor-type rule, (b) underestimate the effect of applying a Taylor-
type rule or (c) simply be unsure on how to calculate EsTt+k, since the exact implementation of
the novel inflation-targeting policy regime has never been explicitly announced. Normalizing the
number of forecasters to one, we can write the forward rate as a function of the representative
agent’s expectation of the future spot rate as
ft|k = p · (EsTt+k) + (1− p) · (EsNt+k), (2)
where p (0 ≤ p ≤ 1) stands for the estimated probability of the central bank using a Taylor-type
rule. Now assume that our agent updates her forecasts based on her beliefs, which are formed
by previous experience (among other things) using Bayesian learning, i.e. past estimates of the
interest rate rule. In general, imagine that our agent considers x previous periods when making
her prediction of the spot rate in period t+ k. Let us say that, for instance, the Fed has made a
switch to stabilizing monetary policy and has used a Taylor-type rule in i of the past x periods.
We can then write p = p(i), where we assume pi > 0, p(0) = 0, and p(x) = 1. Any other factors
affecting the which makes equation 2 more detailed:
ft|k = p ·
(
EsTt+k
)
+ (1− p) · (EsNt+k). (3)
One can think of various scenarios as to how past periods are weighted (e.g. more weight on
more recent periods), so in the following we sketch the simplest version of valuing all past x
periods equally. Although in reality the decision process among forecasters might have been
different, this should suffice to illustrate the general idea. In the case of equal value to all x past
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periods, we can then distinguish between 3 possibilities:
1. i = 0: In none of the x previous periods was a Taylor-type rule applied by either of the 2
participating central banks. In this case, ft|k = EsNt+k.
2. 0 < i < x: i of the past x periods have been marked by the Fed and/or the Bank
of Canada applying a Taylor-type rule. This is the diversified forward rate of ft|k =
( ix) · EsTt+k + (x−ix ) · EsNt+k.
3. i = x: All x previous periods were marked by the application of a Taylor-type rule, which
means ft|k = EsTt+k.
In retrospect we know that all major central banks switched once and never looked back. Thus,
only in the second point above would there be confusion as to how the future spot rate will
be determined. As long as both participating central banks run consistent monetary policy for
at least x + 1 periods (either following or not following a Taylor-type rule) the UIRP should
hold. It is during the x periods after a policy regime change by either of the banks, in which
forecasting models will be mixed, resulting in the FDP. In the following section we proceed to
testing this hypothesis.
3 Empirics
3.1 Methodology
We modify equation (1) to allow for 2 separate regimes: the “adjustment” regime following a
change in monetary policy, lasting x periods for each central bank involved, and the “normal”
regime of constant monetary policy.3 In particular, we allow β to take on 2 values, specific for
each x: β1,x during the adjustment period following the break in policy and β2,x during normal
times of constant monetary policy.
In order to estimate these coefficients, we define a dummy variableDt which equals 1 following
3Hence, we restrict the adjustment period to be of the same duration for both foreign and domestic central
banks. The dates, however, are allowed to differ.
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a change in monetary policy:
Dt =

1, tB < t ≤ tB + x
1, t∗B < t ≤ t∗B + x
0, otherwise
(4)
(5)
(6)
with tB and t
∗
B being the monetary regime shift dates for the home and foreign central bank.
For example, if tB = 10, t
∗
B = 20 and x = 18 months, then D = 1 for t ranging from 11 to 38.
If instead t∗B = 40, then D would be 1 for t = {11, ..., 28} and t = {41, ..., 58}, but 0 otherwise.
For a given adjustment period length x, this results in the following estimable equation:
st+k − ft|k = αx + β1,x(ft|k − st) ·Dt + β2,x(ft|k − st) · (1−Dt) + t+k. (7)
We hypothesize that there exist some x’s for which β1,x is significantly different from zero and,
based on previous research, likely negative, while β2,x is insignificant, meaning the FDP does
not exist outside the adjustment time of x periods. The lowest value of x∗ = min{x} for which
these properties hold will have the meaning of the adjustment period length.
3.2 Data
We use monthly foreign exchange rates for the Canadian dollar, the German mark, and the
British pound, with the U.S. dollar being the base currency. Or data ranges from January
1978 to November 2011 and comes from “Global Insight”.4 Table 1 shows descriptive statistics
for the case of maturity k = 3 months. We are using these four currencies because they have
been pointed out to be examples of major independent central banks undergoing a monetary
regime change to applying a Taylor-type rule, as described in Clarida et al. (1998) and Nikolsko-
Rzhevskyy (2011). In particular, the following break point dates have been identified:
• Canada: January 1988
This is when John Crow, governor of the Bank of Canada, explicitly set price stability as
the Bank’s primary goal in his Hanson Memorial Lecture at the University of Alberta. As
Gordon Thiessen, another former Bank of Canada governor, noted in 2000, “The Hanson
4German data stops in December 1998 due to the introduction of the Euro on January 1, 1999. Exchange and
forward rates are midpoint averages.
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lecture contained probably the strongest commitment to price stability that had ever come
from the Bank of Canada.” (Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy, 2011, page 887).
• Germany: March 1979
Germany entered the European Monetary System (EMS) at the beginning of 1979, which is
normally considered as a start of a new monetary regime (Clarida et al., 1998, page 1044).
The same date is used in Molodtsova et al. (2008, page S67) and Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy
(2011, page 889).
• U.K.: June 1979
This is when Margaret Thatcher came to power and announced the Medium Term Finan-
cial Strategy (MTFS) with its main goal to control inflation, as suggested by Clarida et al.
(1998, page 1054) and Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy (2011, page 891).
• U.S.: August 1979
That month Paul Volcker was appointed as the new Federal Reserve Board Chairman,
who then managed to end the Great Inflation and stabilize prices (see Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy,
2011, page 883). The same breakpoint (the 3rd quarter of 1979) is also used in Orphanides
(2004, page 161).5
With these break points in mind, we now turn to testing our theory using regression analysis.
3.3 Results
Table 2 presents full sample estimates of equation (1) for maturity k = 3 as a representative case
for the FDP. Two out of three currencies, the Canadian dollar (CAD) and the German mark
(DM), show a violation of the UIRP with a negative and significant β. For the British pound
(GBP), the coefficient is not statistically significant, albeit also negative. We complement this
regression output with the variance ratio test, rejecting the random walk null of no predictability
at all conventional levels of significance.
Table 3 displays our main results from estimating equation (7), where we distinguish between
β1 (the coefficient of the forward discount during the adjustment period) and β2 (the coefficient of
5Using October 1979 as an alternative break point as suggested in Clarida et al. (1998, page 1042) does not
change the significance of our results.
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the forward discount outside the adjustment period). We estimate two representative regressions
for each currency: one allowing forecasters x = 18 months to correct their expectations (columns
1 – 3) and another one giving them x = 36 months (columns 4 – 6). In addition, figures (1a)
– (1c) show both coefficients with the two-sided 5% confidence bands for possible adjustment
periods between x = 6 and x = 60 months to illustrate the process of getting used to the new
monetary policy regime.
Columns (1) and (4) in table 3 consider the CAD/USD exchange rate, showing that for both
adjustment periods β1 is highly significant, whereas no forward discount puzzle exists outside
this period. Figure (1a) displays different lengths of adaptation in months, measured on the
x-axis, and the corresponding values for β1 and β2 (with 5% two-sided confidence intervals)
along the y-axis for the Canadian dollar. β2, displayed by the dotted line, is insignificant and
remains so after increasing x up to 60 months. Further, the forward discount β1, displayed by
the solid line, is consistently significant for adjustment periods between 15 and 56 months.
Columns (2) and (5) display regressions for the DM/USD rate. Our expectations are con-
firmed on both the 18 and 36 month horizon: the forward discount during the adaptation period
is significant, whereas there is no significance outside this period. Along with these results, figure
(1b) displays different lengths of adjustment for the German mark. The forward discount is not
significant outside the adjustment period (β2) when allowing forecasters at least 13 months to
adjust. The lowest x for which β1 is consistently significant is about 32 months.
Finally, columns (3) and (6) display results for the GBP/USD exchange rate. Recall that
we do not find a significant forward discount for the full sample from 1978 – 2011 (table 2),
suggesting that the puzzle may not exist for the British currency. However, when recognizing
the break points in monetary policy for the Bank of England and the Fed, we do find that the
puzzle exists in the months after. For adjustment periods of 18 and 36 months, β1 is highly
significant but β2 is not. Figure (1c) confirms our theory: the forward discount is strongly
significant after central banks (in this case the Fed and the Bank of England) changed their
monetary policy – a result that is robust for adjustment periods in between 15 and 60 months.
Outside this adaptation period there is no puzzle, as displayed by β2.
In summary, the main results confirm our theory for all three currencies: the forward discount
disappears once we allow for an adjustment period of about 1 – 2 years after central banks switch
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to following an application of the Taylor rule. The following section performs several robustness
checks.
3.4 Robustness Checks
The following sections display various robustness checks of our main results. Specifically, we
consider whether our results are driven by (1) the maturity of the forward rate, (2) the base
currency, or (3) an alternative hypothesis in which U.S. forecasters switch from analyzing fun-
damentals to charts (as suggested by Moon and Velasco, 2011).
3.4.1 Using different maturities
So far, we have looked at the forward rate with a k = 3 month maturity rate, but do these
results hold when using different maturities? Figures 2 – 4 display our main results for k = 1,
6, and 12 month maturities for adjustment period lengths up to x = 60 months.
Figures (2a) – (2c) look at the 1 month maturity for the CAD/USD, DM/USD, and GBP/USD
exchange rates. In all cases, we observe that there exists no forward discount after only allowing
forecasters an adjustment period of a few months. β1 on the other hand is significant for most
possible adjustment periods up to 60 months for the CAD and the GBP. Only for the DM do
we observe a bumpier process of adjustment as shown by figure (2b). This suggests that the
adjustment was not always smooth everywhere and potentially that other reasons might have
contributed to the FDP in this instance. Figures (2d) – (2f) and (2g) – (2i) depict graphs for the
6 and 12 month forward rate. Throughout all three currencies (with GBP/USD results being
somewhat weaker), there exists no FDP when allowing forecasters about 18 – 48 months to get
used to the new regime. The only result which is somewhat off with the rest is the British pound
in figure (2i) that suggests a significantly longer adjustment period of almost 5 years.
3.4.2 Using different base currencies
To test whether our results are in any way driven by the fact that all our exchange rates are
measured against the USD, we now look at what happens if we express all exchange and forward
rates in terms of the CAD or the GBP.
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Figures (3a) and (3b) display 3 month forward rates of the DM and the GBP, both against
the CAD.6 Figure (3a) confirms our theory: β1 is significantly different from zero after allowing
for x = 11 months to adjust and β2 is insignificant outside the adjustment period. The British
pound in figure (3b) takes a little longer to react, since only after allowing for 23 months do our
results hold up. After that β2 becomes and stays insignificant.
Figure (3c) shows results for the DM when using the British pound as a base currency.7 While
β1 is highly significant as expected, β2 is only on the verge of insignificance. One explanation
why the DM/GBP rate may behave somewhat differently from other exchange rates could be
the special relationship between the Bundesbank and the Bank of England: between October
1990 and September 1992, the Bank of England was a part of the European Exchange Rate
Mechanism, thus not being independent from the Bundesbank.
Overall, violations of the UIRP do not seem to be driven by the Fed only, but rather by
changes in monetary policy of all central banks in question.
3.4.3 Using only the U.S. break point
Our theory is crucially based on the definition of break points. Since we are only looking at
major central banks (the Fed, the Bank of Canada, the Bundesbank, and the Bank of England),
we assume that monetary policy switches to applying a Taylor-type rule on both sides of an
exchange rate play a decisive role. In another theory, Moon and Velasco (2011) attribute the
FDP to a change in forecasting techniques by U.S. forecasters from 1980 – 1987 and assume a
single 8-year-long adjustment period. Since the Fed’s change in monetary policy (August 1979)
falls right before this time period, our findings could just happen to coincide with this switch
in forecasting techniques. Judging from the previous robustness check, however, this is unlikely
to be the case since our results with alternative base currencies still receive support. Another
way to test this is to reestimate our model, allowing for one break point only. Since the break
points for Germany and the U.K occurred within 8 months from the Fed’s regime change, it
makes sense to look at the CAD/USD rate, as the Canadian break point falls outside the 1980
– 1987 timeframe suggested by Moon and Velasco (2011). The CAD regime change occurred in
6The USD against the CAD returns the equivalent to figure (1a).
7The graphs for US/GBP and CAD/GBP are equivalent to figures (1c) and (5b).
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January 1988. Figure (3d) shows β1 and β2 when only allowing for the Fed’s break point in the
CAD/USD exchange rate. Notice that we extend the time frame displayed up to 120 months
here, mimicking Moon and Velasco (2011). There is no difference in terms of significance if we
look at the time during or outside the adjustment period: both β1 and β2 are insignificant for
up to 89 months.
In summary, our results do not seem to be driven by the maturity of the forward rate or the
base currency. Further, it seems unlikely that our results coincide with another explanation as
regime changes by both participating central banks seem to play a role in creating the FDP.
4 Conclusion
This paper argues that a major cause of the forward discount puzzle (FDP) – the violation of
the uncovered interest rate parity (UIRP) – are switches by central banks from a destabilizing
regime (not using a Taylor-type rule) to a stabilizing regime (following a Taylor-type rule). First,
we develop a model relating these regime changes to the forward discount puzzle. After a central
bank switches to using a Taylor-type rule, forecasters fail in predicting the exchange rate and
need time to adjust to the new regime. This period of adaptation is when the forward discount
puzzle emerges. Our empirical part confirms this theory examining the Canadian dollar, the
German mark, and the British pound, all against the U.S. dollar. Indeed, the UIRP is only
significantly violated during the adjustment periods of about 1 – 2 years following the regime
changes by both respective central banks. The forward discount puzzle is not significant outside
the adjustment periods. Our results are robust to using different maturities and base currencies.
Further, using only one break point for an exchange rate and neglecting the regime change by
the opposite central bank does not seem sufficient. This substantially weakens the possibility of
our explanation coinciding with any other contemporary events.
Our results provide additional evidence for the expectations errors hypothesis, one of the
most prominent potential explanations for the forward discount puzzle. By naming and testing
a specific reason for why expectations are biased – major regime switches to applying a Taylor-
type rule – this result adds another piece to solving the forward discount puzzle.
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Figure 3: Using Different Base Currencies or Only the U.S. Break Point
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Table 1: Summary Statistics (k = 3-month maturity)
Mean Sample Period Observations Break Point
(Std. Dev.)
Canadian dollar January 1988
Foreign excess -0.0023 January 1978 – 404
Returns (0.0307)) November 2011
s(t+ k)− f(t|k)
Forward discount 0.0017 January 1978 – 404
f(t|k)− s(t) (0.0040) November 2011
German mark January 1979
Foreign excess 0.0026 January 1978 – 248
Returns (0.0587) December 1998
s(t+ k)− f(t|k)
Forward discount -0.0051 January 1978 – 248
f(t|k)− s(t) (0.0082) December 1998
British pound June 1979
Foreign excess -0.0027 January 1978 – 404
Returns (0.0543) November 2011
s(t+ k)− f(t|k)
Forward discount 0.0041 January 1978 – 404
f(t|k)− s(t) (0.0060) November 2011
US dollar August 1979
Notes: Break points indicate the respective central bank’s switch in monetary policy (please see section 3.2
for details). The source of data is “Global Insight.” Data for Germany stops in December, 1998 due to the
introduction of the Euro on January 1, 1999.
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Table 2: Full Sample Results, k = 3 month maturity
(1) (2) (3)
Canadian German British
dollar mark pound
Dependent variable :
foreign excess returns, s(t+ 3)− f(t|3)
Constant -0.000 -0.005 0.005
(0.003) (-0.007) (0.005)
Forward discount -1.111* -1.429* -1.854
f(t|3)− s(t) (0.620) (0.742) (1.225)
Variance ratio test 3.106 4.664 5.033
P-value 0.006** 0.000** 0.000**
R2 0.021 0.040 0.042
Observations 404 248 404
Notes: * and ** indicate significance at the 10 and 5 percent level. Newey-West corrected standard errors are
in parentheses. All exchange rates are measured against the U.S. dollar. p-value for the variance ratio test for
foreign excess returns are obtained using the wild bootstrap method as recommended by Kim (2006).
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